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Abstract
In spite of the great volume of law and economics research carried out in the eld
of tort law, there exists a gap in the literature concerning the eects of dier-
ent tort remedies, namely money damages and restitution in natura. Although
there is a parallel between the above mentioned remedies and the remedies for
breach of contract, i.e. money damages and specic performance, the analysis
of the latter does not apply in torts; the high transaction costs involved in such
involuntary transactions bring about fundamental changes in it. The aim of this
paper is to perform a comparative analysis of money damages and restitution
in natura from an eciency perspective. The basis of the comparison is the
relation of each of the remedies to the `ideal' compensation, which, at least in
principle, corresponds to the subjective accident loss for the victim. According
to the conclusion reached, no rule is generally preferable to the other. Thus,
it is crucial to sort the dierent types of cases and apply the remedy which is
better suited to each one of them. The normative proposition derived is that
judges should be granted the discretion to decide on the adequate remedy on a
case-to-case basis. On this premise, I proceed to a comparative analysis of the
relevant legal rules in Germany, England, Greece, and France, since each legal
system tackles this issue dierently.REMEDIES FOR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY: 










In spite of the great volume of law and economics research carried out in the field 
of tort law, there exists a gap in the literature concerning the effects of different tort 
remedies, namely money damages and restitution in natura. Although there is a parallel 
between the above mentioned remedies and the remedies for breach of contract, i.e. 
money damages and specific performance, the analysis of the latter does not apply in 
torts; the high transaction costs involved in such involuntary transactions bring about 
fundamental changes in it.  
 The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative analysis of money damages 
and restitution in natura from an efficiency perspective. The basis of the comparison is 
the relation of each of the remedies to the ‘ideal’ compensation, which, at least in 
principle, corresponds to the subjective accident loss for the victim. According to the 
conclusion reached, no rule is generally preferable to the other. Thus, it is crucial to sort 
the different types of cases and apply the remedy which is better suited to each one of 
them. The normative proposition derived is that judges should be granted the discretion to 
decide on the adequate remedy on a case-to-case basis.  On this premise, I proceed to a 
comparative analysis of the relevant legal rules in Germany, England, Greece, and 
France, since each legal system tackles this issue differently. 
                                                 
* Lena_Zervogianni@hotmail.com, LL.B., EMLE (Hamburg), Ph.D. candidate at the Law School of the 
University of Athens. The support given by the Graduiertenkolleg Recht und Ökonomik (University of 
Hamburg) and the European Commission-in the framework of the Marie Curie Fellowship Program-is 
gratefully acknowledged. I would also like to thank Aristides Hatzis, Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, Francesco 
Parisi, Thomas Ulen and Georg von Wangenheim for their helpful comments. The editorial comments of 
Youlika Kotsovolou Masry were very valuable and I thank her very much.    
1 Zervogianni: REMEDIES FOR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY: MONEY DAMAGES OR RESTITUTIO




2. Evaluation of the Rules ...............................................................................................6 
2.1. Efficiency Considerations Focusing on the Incentives of the Victim.........................6 
2.1.1. Cases where the Diminution of the Price Equals the Costs of Repair .....................6 
2.1.2. Cases where the Costs of Repair Exceed the Diminution of the Market Value .......8 
2.1.2.1. Case A: Subjective Damages are Less than the Diminution of the Market Value.9 
2.1.2.2. Case B: Subjective Damages are More than the Diminution of the Market Value, 
but Less than the Repair Costs.......................................................................................10 
2.1.2.3. Other Cases......................................................................................................11 
2.2. The Incentives of the Tortfeasor in Particular .........................................................11 
2.3. Costs of Implementation.........................................................................................12 
2.4. Synopsis of the Results and Formulation of a Normative Proposition.....................13 
3. Short Overview of Different Legal Systems ..............................................................15 






2 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2004,  Paper 7
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2004/iss1/art7MONEY DAMAGES OR RESTITUTION IN NATURA?               Eleni Zervogianni   3  
1. Introduction  
 
An important aim of tort law from a law and economics perspective is efficient 
accident deterrence.
1 This can be achieved if liability rules are designed in a way to 
provide both the tortfeasor and the victim with incentives to engage in their activity 
adopting optimal levels of care and activity.
2 One important variable of this problem is 
the accident loss. On the basis of this value courts determine the amount of compensation 
owed by the tortfeasor to the victim, in case the former is held liable, thus influencing the 
incentives of the parties. This variable is more important under a strict liability rule than 
under a negligence rule, due to the character of the first rule as a price and of the second 
as a sanction.
3  Even so, it maintains a certain importance in all cases.    
 However, an implicit assumption in all the relevant models is that accident costs 
can be assessed in a perfect way. If this strong assumption is relaxed and the subjective 
valuation of the victim is brought into the picture, the situation becomes puzzling: the 
subjective loss of the victim of an accident is not observable by third parties.
4 Moreover, 
the victim himself will never voluntarily reveal his true subjective costs; instead, he has 
incentives to overstate them, so that he can benefit from a higher compensation.  
Given these conditions, courts actually rely on observable proxies, in order to 
evaluate the unobservable damage that has been sustained. In the context of damage to 
property, two principles of compensation have evolved over time. In their most plain 
version, they can be described as follows:
5 
                                                 
1According to Calabresi, the aim of accident law is to minimize all accident costs, namely the number and 
the severity of accidents (primary costs), the social costs (secondary costs), and the administrative costs 
(tertiary costs). See Calabresi, G., The Costs of Accidents (1970), pp. 26 ff. Since the pursuit of each sub-
goal is at least partially contradicting the pursuit of the others, in this paper I focus mainly on the 
minimization of the primary accidents costs, which I hold as logically prior. 
2 See, among others, Brown, J.P., “Towards an Economic Theory of Liability”, 2 Journal of Legal Studies, 
pp. 323 ff, Shavell, S., Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987), Landes, W./ Posner, R., The Economic 
Structure of Tort Law (1987), and Schäfer, H.-B./ Ott, C., Lehrbuch der Ökonomischen Analyse des 
Zivilrechts (3
rd edit. 2000), pp.117 ff. 
3 See Cooter, R.,  “Prices and Sanctions”, 84 Columbia Law Review, pp. 1523 ff . 
4 See De Alessi, L./ Staaf, R., “Subjective Value in Contract Law”, 145 Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, pp. 561 ff.; Schmidtchen, D., “Time, Uncertainty and Subjectivism: Giving more 
Body to Law and Economics”, 13 International Review of Law and Economics, pp. 61 ff., p. 69. 
5 A lot of variations of these basic rules have been developed over time.  In what follows, I focus on the 
effects of the rules in their simplest form, unless otherwise indicated. 
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a. money damages covering the diminution of the value of the damaged thing.  
This rule protects the interest of the victim in the value of the thing. In other words, after 
compensation, the victim is not any poorer, objectively speaking, than he was before the 
accident. 
b. restitution in natura, meaning the actual restoration of the situation as it was 
before the damage, by repairing or replacing the damaged thing. This rule protects the 
interest of the victim in a specific item.
6 The particularity of this remedy is that the costs 
incurred by the tortfeasor in the event of restitution in natura do not necessarily 
correspond to the benefits that the victim derives from it. This is a key element for the 
subsequent analysis.  
At this point it is worth noting that there is a parallel between the two rules 
mentioned here and the two basic remedies for breach of contract, namely, money 
damages and specific performance.
7 However, the problematic is fundamentally different 
in contract law as compared to tort law. 
 More specifically, the terms of a contract are agreed upon by the parties and the 
contract is priced accordingly. Thus, if a party attaches subjective value to a specific 
outcome, he may want to secure this outcome by agreeing on the contract remedy of 
specific performance.
8 This remedy, however, makes the breach of contract more 
expensive for the other contracting party. The latter, anticipating this, will demand a 
higher price.
9 If this pricing mechanism works correctly, a contracting party will not have 
                                                 
6 Restitution in natura is a property rule remedy in the sense of Calabresi / Melamed. See Calabresi G. 
/Melamed D., “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability”, 85 Harvard Law Review, pp.1089, ff.. 
This is puzzling considering that in torts the transaction costs of ex ante bargaining are prohibitively high. 
The corresponding problem in the context of contract law is phrased by Kronman who examines the role of 
expectation damages (liability rule) as the default remedy for breach of contract, in spite of the low 
transactions costs between contracting parties. (See Kronman, A., “Specific Performance”, 45 University of 
Chicago Law Review, pp. 351 ff., p.352-354).  
7 In contract law there is extensive literature on this issue. See, among others Kronman, A., supra note 6; 
Schwartz, A., “The Case for Specific Performance”, 89 Yale Law Journal, pp. 271ff.; Ulen, T., “The 
Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 Michigan Law 
Review, pp. 341ff.; De Alessi, L./ Staaf, R., supra note 4.  
8 I am assuming, for the sake of the argument, that parties can stipulate to specific performance as a 
remedy. 
9 See, among others, Kronman, A., supra note 6, p. 366; Ulen, T., under “Specific Performance” in 
Newman, P. (ed), The new Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (1998),  Vol 3, pp. 481ff., p. 
482; Craswell, R., “Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach”, 61 Southern 
California Law Review, pp.629 ff., p. 631. This is also the starting point of Mahoney’s analysis in 
Mahoney, P., “Contract Remedies and Options Pricing”, 24 Journal of Legal Studies, pp.139 ff., p. 140. 
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any incentive to overstate his subjective valuation on performance. In addition, other 
contract doctrines, like for example the doctrine of foreseeability, may induce a party 
with a high subjective value on performance to divulge this and, consequently, limit his 
potential to behave opportunistically.
10 Thus the informational asymmetry between the 
contracting parties is somehow mitigated. On these premises, specific performance as a 
default remedy may induce post-breach bargaining, which may be more efficient than a 
court judgement in protecting the innocent party’s subjective valuation on performance.
11  
Torts, on the other hand, are involuntary transactions. Pre-accident agreements 
cannot take place because of prohibitive transaction costs. Moreover, there is no way to 
mitigate the information asymmetry between the parties. Under these conditions, post-
accident bargaining does not always lead to efficient results. This changes fundamentally 
the analysis of the tort remedies. Thus, the argumentation derived from the economic 
analysis of the contract law remedies cannot be applied, at least not directly, to the tort 
cases examined in this paper.  
The aim of this paper is to compare the tort remedies of restitution in natura and 
money damages from an efficiency perspective. Of course, such comparison can take 
place only to the extent that these two remedies can be viewed as alternatives. In other 
words, I treat cases where the repair or replacement of the damaged thing can be at least 
as satisfactory as money damages. If, in spite of the restoration, a certain reduced value of 
the thing persists, restitution in natura is no longer an alternative to monetary 
compensation. Therefore, the paper does not deal with damages which cannot be made 
good with restitution in natura. 
I approach the topic as follows: I show that the two rules can lead to different 
results; then I compare them and derive a normative proposition (2). On the basis of this 
proposition I evaluate the rules of different legal systems (3). In the conclusion I sum up 
all the results and mention possible extensions of the paper (4). 
 
                                                 
10  See Muris, T., “Costs of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of Subjective 
Value”, 12 Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 379 ff., p. 383. It should be noted that there is some controversy 
on this matter. However, a further analysis of this issue exceeds the scope of this paper.  
11 See De Alessi L./ Staaf R., supra note 4, p. 572; Ulen, T., supra note 9. 
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2. Evaluation of the Rules 
In this section I compare the effects of the rule of restitution in natura and the rule 
of money damages along the lines of the following dimensions: first, I analyze the rules 
from an efficiency perspective, focusing on the incentives of the victim (2.1). Then, I 
comment on the effect of the rules on the incentives of the tortfeasor in particular (2.2). 
This analysis is followed by some considerations about the implementation costs of each 
rule (2.3). Finally, based on the above results, I formulate a normative proposition (2.4.). 
 
2.1. Efficiency Considerations Focusing on the Incentives of the Victim     
 As already noted, the amount of compensation that the tortfeasor anticipates he 
will pay in the event of an accident influences his choice about his level of care and 
activity. Likewise, in bilateral cases, i.e. in cases where the behavior of the victim can 
influence the probability and the extent of the accident loss, the expected compensation 
also influences the decisions of the victim, as far as precaution is concerned. 
 The way I proceed is by distinguishing between cases where the monetary value 
of the restitution in natura and the money damages are equal (2.1.1.), and cases where the 
costs for the tortfeasor to restitute the damage in natura are greater than the diminution of 
the value of the thing (2.1.2.).
12 
 
2.1.1. Cases where the Diminution of the Price Equals the Costs of Repair 
On many occasions the diminution of the value of an item corresponds to the 
costs of its repair or replacement. This is mainly the case for serious damages which 
prevent the proper use of the thing.  
At first glance it seems that in such cases the choice of the legal rule is irrelevant. 
However, this is true only if the subjective costs of the victim equal the diminution of the 
market value of the thing. In any different case the choice of the legal rule matters. This 
can be illustrated on the basis of the following graph (“S” stands for the subjective 
diminution of the value, “O” for the (objective) diminution of the value, i.e. drop in the 
                                                 
12 The cases where the diminution of the market value of the thing is greater than the repair costs, as for 
example in case of severe car accidents (the repaired car is usually still less valuable than it was before the 
accident), are not treated because, as already mentioned, in these cases the two rules are no longer 
alternatives; if the remedy applied is restitution in natura, the extra loss will persist. Such losses can only 
be covered by monetary compensation. 
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market price, and “R” for the actual repair or replacement)     
       (S)
13    O=R   Costs for tortfeasor 
 
 
   
 
        S=R   O   Benefits for victim 
S can be less than O and R if, for instance, the pre-accident subjective value of the 
damaged thing was less that its market price. Although this case does not seem very 
probable because the victim would have sold the thing in the first place, it could occur 
since markets for used things do not always function well.  
Under the above mentioned circumstances, S would be the ideal compensation. 
Under both O and R rules the tortfeasor internalizes more than the harm he externalized. 
However, there is a fundamental difference as far as the benefits that the victim derives 
under each rule.  
Rule O overcompensates the victim, in the sense that the latter, by disposing 
freely the amount of the compensation, can reach a higher indifference curve than the one 
he was on before the accident. This suggests that in the case of O rule the problem of the 
moral hazard of the victim arises. 
Under rule R, on the other hand, the exact pre-accident situation of the victim is 
restored (i.e. the thing is actually repaired), so he is as well off as before. It is evident that 
rule R is inefficient, since it leads to misallocation of resources. In the cases examined 
here, the same amount of money would yield more utility for the victim, had it been used 
for purposes other than the repair of the damaged thing. 
Nevertheless, the choice of the remedy matters as far as bargaining is concerned. 
More specifically, rule R can induce the parties to bargain, if transaction costs are low 
enough (Application of the Coase Theorem). This is due to the asymmetry between the 
costs of the tortfeasor to repair the thing and the benefits that the victims derives from it. 
The victim would settle for an amount of money which is less than the costs of repair but 
                                                 
13 The parentheses are used in order to indicate that the subjective value of the victims is to the tortfeasor. 
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higher than S, and the tortfeasor would, of course, be willing to pay less than R. 
Therefore, the scope of bargaining is between S and R.  
In theory, the efficient bargaining outcome would be yielded if the victim would 
not appropriate any bargaining surplus, in which case the compensation would 
correspond to his subjective costs. However, such a result presupposes that the victim 
does not have any bargaining power. This can never be the case, given the information 
asymmetry between the victim and the tortfeasor: the victim knows the threat point of the 
tortfeasor but the latter does not know the threat point of the former. Thus, the bargaining 
result will be a point between S and R. Even so, the result of rule R after bargaining 
distorts the incentives of the parties less than the initial result. Rule R cannot do worse 
than rule O. 
In general, the decision as to which rule is preferable under these circumstances 
depends on the probability of bargaining and the costs of bargaining. If the expected gain 
from bargaining, which consists in the decrease of the distortion of the incentives facing 
both parties, exceeds the expected cost from the misallocation of resources, caused by the 
inefficient repair, then R is preferable. In any other case O is preferable.    
   
2.1.2. Cases where the Costs of Repair Exceed the Diminution of the Market Value 
In many instances, the diminution of the market value of a thing because of 
damage is less than the costs needed for its repair or replacement. This is due to the fact 
that prices of things are derived from people’s marginal willingness to pay for them 
which may depend on factors other than their objectively assessed quality. This effect is 
strengthened by the fact that things get individualized after being damaged.  
Consider the following examples: 
- Someone draws a line with a pen on a precious painting. Before the line was 
drawn, the value of the painting was 500. After the line, the painting can only be sold for 
400. To remove the line costs 200. 
- A car is scratched. In such case the diminution of the value of the car is much 
less than the costs of repairing the scratch, even though there exists a pretty good market 
for used cars.  
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Hence, the value of the money damages and that of the restitution in natura may 
not coincide. This means that the tortfeasor will have to pay different amounts of 
compensation depending on the legal rule which applies.  
In order to evaluate the rule of money damages and the rule of restitution in 
natura, it is necessary to look into their possible relation to the subjective damage of the 
victim. For this purpose I distinguish between cases where subjective damages are less 
than the diminution of the market price and cases where subjective damages are more 
than the diminution of the market price, but less than the repair costs. In what follows I 
analyze each case separately. 
 
2.1.2.1. Case A: Subjective Damages are Less than the Diminution of the Market 
Value 
This case can be depicted as follows.  
         Costs for tortfeasor 
  
      (S)    O      R    
 
 
   S=R              O    Benefits for victim 
Such a case may arise when the damage does not prevent the use of the thing in 
which the victim is interested. The damage will, of course, diminish the resale value of 
the thing but this is of no great interest to the owner, since he does not intend to resell it. 
In any case, the repair of the damaged thing may cost more than the diminution of its 
market value. 
As mentioned above, perfect compensation would be S. Under both R and O 
rules, the tortfeasor internalizes more than the harm he externalized. In addition, rule O 
distorts the incentives of the victim as far as precaution measures are concerned, since he 
is overcompensated. However, rule R may lead to misallocation of resources, if no 
bargaining takes place.  
Nonetheless, under rule R, parties may bargain. The scope of bargaining is, as in 
the previous case, between S and R. Although S will never be an equilibrium, bargaining 
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could mitigate to some extent the inefficiencies of the R rule. The victim, however, will 
pretend that his threat point is at least O. The bargaining result will be between O and R, 
and most likely, taking into account the increased bargaining power of the victim, closer 
to R. This result distorts the incentives of the victim more than the O rule.   
Hence, in the majority of such cases, rule O is less inefficient than rule R. 
 
2.1.2.2. Case B: Subjective Damages are More than the Diminution of the Market 
Value, but Less than the Repair Costs. 
The depiction of this case would be as follows: 
                O   (S)     R Costs for tortfeasor 
 
 
         
 
                            O   S=R    Benefits for victim 
  
Such cases seem to be the most usual ones. A typical example is that of a 
scratched car. The subjective value, which in this case is higher than the market price, is 
not only due to personal attachment; it can also be due to the non-perfect substitutability 
of the good. This seems to be the case, especially under conditions that favor ‘markets for 
lemons’. 
 As it can be seen from the lines in the above graph, O rule leads to 
undercompensation of the victim. This means that the tortfeasor does not internalize all 
the harm he externalized. Rule R on the other hand, performs in exactly the same way as 
in case A. In other words, R is more costly for the tortfeasor without overcompensating 
the victim. Thus, it is not efficient. 
 Nonetheless, under rule R there is scope for bargaining between S and R. The 
result will be a point between S and R, depending on the bargaining power of the parties, 
and most likely closer to R, since the tortfeasor does not know the threat point of the 
victim. 
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Comparing rules O and R, the result depends on the exact position of S. In 
general, performing the same analysis as in the previous cases, it seems that the rule 
under which the compensation closer approximates the loss of the victim is preferable. 
 
2.1.2.3. Other Cases 
Symmetrically, a third case seems to exist where the subjective damages exceed 
the repair costs. This implies that, even after repair, there will be some residual damage 
for the victim. These cases are out of the scope of this paper, because I treat only those 
where money damages and restitution in natura are alternatives. If it is infeasible to 
compensate with repair, there is nothing left to compare. Money damages are the only 
possible remedy. 
 
2.2. The Incentives of the Tortfeasor in Particular 
From the point of view of the tortfeasor, adopting the efficient level of care and 
activity presupposes the anticipation of the amount of compensation he will have to pay if 
he is found liable. However, in most accident cases the tortfeasor acts behind ‘a veil of 
ignorance’; he cannot know ex ante the victim’s valuation of the damage. Usually, he 
cannot even anticipate exactly which item he is going to damage.  
As follows from the foregoing analysis, rule O leads to the tortfeasor’s 
internalizing sometimes more and sometimes less than the actually inflicted harm. 
Nevertheless, if the diminution of the market value of a thing were a good indicator of the 
mean value of damages suffered by the victims, in spite of the possible deviations from 
case to case, the incentives of the tortfeasor concerning accident deterrence would be 
overall efficient.  
However, this does not seem to be the case since, according to the findings of 
experimental economic studies, a person’s willingness to pay for a good is systematically 
less than his willingness to accept for the same good.
14 This implies an affection of 
individuals for their own goods; therefore the subjective value of a thing is usually higher 
than its market price. This does not necessarily determine the result of the comparison 
                                                 
14This effect is known as the ‘endowment effect’ (See Korobkin, R. / Ulen, T., “Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics”, 88 California Law Review, 
pp.1051 ff., p. 1107).  
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between the ‘objective’ and the subjective diminution of the value. However, there seems 
to be a positive correlation between the two. 
Rule R, on the other hand, seems to perform better when there is a subjective 
value attached to the damaged thing, higher than its market value. However, under this 
rule the tortfeasor is usually led to internalize more than the damage he caused. 
Consequently, if this were the only applicable rule, overdeterrence would result. 
If courts can decide which rule to apply on a case-to-case basis, it seems at first 
glance logical to deny any ex ante effect of the rules on the incentives of the tortfeasor, 
since usually he cannot know ex ante under which case he will fall. However, this is not 
exact; even so, the tortfeasor can estimate the mean value of compensation that the victim 
was awarded in past cases. This amount can be expressed as a percentage of the 
diminution of the market value of a thing (e.g. the mean compensation a victim usually 
receives may amount in general to 120% of the diminution of the market value.) Then, 
the tortfeasor can solve his maximization problem by calculating the expected 
compensation he will pay, once found liable, accordingly.  
This is efficient, provided that the compensation that the victims usually receive is 
the best possible approximation of their subjective losses, without any systematic 
tendency of over- or undercompensation. Empirical studies on this issue would be of 
great value.  
 
2.3. Costs of Implementation 
Apart from the bargaining costs between the parties, in cases of a rule of 
restitution in natura, mentioned in section 2.1, further considerations about the additional 
costs of implementation of each rule are merited. 
 More specifically, monetary compensation consisting in the diminution of the 
market value of the thing, involves costs which refer to the calculation of this diminution. 
The more individualized a thing is, the more these costs rise, and they reach their peak in 
the case of unique goods.
15 These costs are, at least to some extent,
16 borne by the 
courts.
17 
                                                 
15 See Kronman, A., supra note. 6, pp. 360-361. 
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 The application of the rule of restitution in natura does not impose considerable 
costs on the courts, since the tortfeasor must achieve a certain result (i.e. the restitution) 
independently of the relevant costs. However, a rational tortfeasor will have already 
anticipated the cost of repair, in order to adjust ex ante his level of care and activity. This 
conversion is not costly, if a competitive market for repair is assumed. In any case, the 
costs involved seem to be systematically less than the costs of pricing the diminution of 
the value of a thing. 
 It is often claimed that the application of the rule of restituton in natura is more 
costly, because it involves high monitoring costs and could lead to further disputes of the 
parties as to whether the repair was proper or not. 
18 This argument, however, is not 
decisive; in a competitive market for repairs, it will not arise. Even if this does not hold, it 
could be encountered if the victim and the tortfeasor were required to agree on the 
relevant issues before performing the repair.
19  
 It is difficult to determine categorically which rule is associated with higher 
implementation costs. 
20 This varies from case to case. However, it would be reasonable 
to claim that, in general, if transaction costs would be the only relevant variable, 
restitution in natura would be preferable the more individualized a thing is, since in these 
cases it is difficult to evaluate the diminution of its market value. 
 
2.4. Synopsis of the Results and Formulation of a Normative Proposition 
To sum up, neither restitution in natura nor money damages provide both the 
victim and the tortfeasor with the efficient incentives in all cases. There does not seem to 
exist an optimal solution to the problem of compensating the real (subjective) accident 
losses. Looking for a second best solution, it seems reasonable to classify the cases in 
                                                                                                                                            
16 This extent depends also on the relevant procedural rules. In any case, the court will have to evaluate the 
accuracy of the claim of the plaintiff.  
17 See, among others, Ulen, T., supra note 7, p. 384. 
18 See, among others, Schwartz, G., “The Case for Specific Performance”, 89 Yale Law Journal, pp. 271 ff, 
pp. 292-3, who poses and treats this problem in the context of the remedy of specific performance in 
contract law. 
19 If the victim chooses the mode of repair alone and the tortfeasor has to pay the bill, there is the danger of 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the victim, who might collude with the repairman, charge a higher 
price, and share the extracted benefit.  
20 Similar statement is made by Kronman, A., supra note 6, p. 374, concerning the costs of specific 
performance as compared to the costs of expectation damages.  
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different categories and treat them separately. The more the mean amount of 
compensation of the victims approximates their subjective costs, the better the incentives 
of the parties are aligned. 
In cases where the diminution of the value equals the costs of restitution in 
natura, the latter remedy is preferable, if bargaining is possible. 
 The rest of the cases could be sorted out it two main groups, on the basis of the 
magnitude of the subjective valuation involved:
21 the higher the subjective valuation 
involved, the more suitable the remedy of restitution in natura. Such distinctions may 
appear arbitrary in the examination of each specific case but could lead to rather 
satisfactory results overall.  
A key element of this analysis is that the judge is able to identify roughly the 
different types of cases. A starting point seems to be the presumption that the subjective 
costs of the victim exceed the diminution of the market value of the thing.
22 Further 
criteria may refer either to the owner of the thing or to the thing itself. More specifically, 
in cases where a legal person is the owner of the thing (e.g. car belonging to a company), 
it is unlikely that any subjective value would be involved. The same is valid for things 
which are owned by natural persons but are merely functional (e.g. instruments of work). 
Moreover, subjective value seems to increase as the age of the thing increases. This is 
due to the fact that relatively new things can be replaced rather easily, whereas things 
tend to get more individualized through continuous use.  
Of course, the distinction will not be perfect in all cases but as long as the errors 
are stochastic and there is not a systematic tendency of over- or undercompensation of the 
victim, the incentive effects of the rules are not distorted. 
Finally, apart from the incentives of the parties, the probability of inefficiency 
resulting from the misallocation of resources, because of inefficient repair, should also be 
considered. This case arises if R rule is not followed by bargaining. In theory, there does 
not seem to be a reason why this should occur; the identity of the parties is not disputed, 
and both the victim and the tortfeasor are advised by lawyers; so transaction costs seem 
                                                 
21 A similar distinction was proposed by Muris, T. (supra note 10, p. 382) in the context of contracts. 
22 See Korobkin, R.  / Ulen, T., supra note 14. 
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low. However, any empirical evidence pointing to the opposite direction should be taken 
into account.  
The normative proposition which is drawn from the above analysis is that legal 
systems which recognize both tort remedies are preferable. More specifically, a legal 
system in which differentiation can be made as to which rule should be applied in each 
case, can lead to rather satisfactory results, provided, of course, that the courts follow a 
coherent practice, so that legal certainty is not at stake. 
  
3. Short Overview of Different Legal Systems 
Legal systems can be divided into four categories, according to the way they deal 
with tort remedies. The first category includes countries where restitution in natura is the 
main rule and money damages are granted only if restitution in natura is impossible or 
disproportionally costly (e.g. Germany–at least according to the letter of the law). At the 
other end of the continuum stand countries where the remedy of restitution in natura is 
practically unknown, at least as far as damages to things are concerned (e.g. England). In 
countries of the third and the fourth category it is possible for both tort remedies to be 
applied to each specific case, either on equal terms (e.g. France), or by recognizing a 
certain priority to the rule of money damages vs. the restitution in natura (e.g. Greece). 
 In the light of the conclusions of section 2, I now proceed to examine and 
evaluate the law of Germany, England, Greece, and France respectively. It is worth 
noting, however, that the full compensation of the victim for his material losses is a 
general principle in all the legal systems listed above. 
 
3.1. Germany 
The main relevant clauses in the German Civil Code are §§ 249 and 251 BGB. 
According to §249 BGB, the tortfeasor has to restore in natura the situation that would 
exist, had it not been for the culprit’s wrongful behavior. However, in the case of the 
damage of a thing, the victim has the right to demand, instead of the actual restitution, the 
corresponding amount of money (§249.2 BGB). In fact, this is a kind of monetary 
compensation whose amount is not calculated on the basis of the diminution of the value 
of the thing, but on the basis of the repair costs. § 249 BGB was recently modified by the 
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addition of a special provision
23, according to which the value added tax (VAT) is not 
included in the compensation, unless it is actually paid. Finally, according to §251 BGB, 
compensation can be monetary (calculated on the basis of the difference theory
24, which 
more or less coincides with the diminution of the value of the thing) in cases where 
restitution is impossible, inefficient, or disproportionally costly.   
In practice, although the principle is restitution in natura, this is interpreted 
broadly, given the provision of §249.2; so the victim is routinely granted the costs of 
repair.
25 However, the latter does not have to invest this amount in the actual repair of the 
thing. This stems from the principle of freedom of disposition.
26 Moreover, since the 
compensation received by the victim is in the end monetary, there is no scope for 
bargaining. Therefore, the result is systematic overcompensation of the victim which 
leads to the distortion of the incentives of both parties. However, the misallocation of 
resources resulting from an inefficient repair is prevented.  
The distortion of the incentives of the parties is strengthened by the fact that the 
courts award repair damages even for things which the victim cannot repair because he 
no longer owns them.
27 The German legal term for this type of damages is “fiktiven 
Reparaturkosten” and can be rendered in English as “fictitious damages”. This issue has 
been questioned for a long time.
28 The Highest Court (BGH) decided in 1976
29 that repair 
costs are awarded only if it is possible for the victim to perform the repair; if not, §251 
BGB applies. However, in 1985 the practice of the courts changed.
30 Since then, fictitious 
                                                 
23 The Schadensersatzrechtsreform added this sentence to the second paragraph of §249 BGB. 
24 The difference theory was first formulated by Mommsen in 1885.  (See Magnus, U., Schaden und Ersatz, 
(1987), p. 10 ff). According to its plainer version, the amount of damage is determined by the comparison 
of the value of the property of the victim after the accident, and that which would exist, had the accident 
not taken place. Since then, legal scholars have analyzed this theory extensively. A lot of variations of this 
theory have developed. (See Schiemann, G. in von Staundigers J., Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch, §§249-254 BGB, (13th edit, 1998), § 249 BGB, No 5 ff, p.62). In German law the objective 
version of the theory is followed (See Magnus, U., “Damages under German Law”, in Magnus, U. (ed), 
Unification of Tort Law: Damages, ( 2001), pp. 89 ff, p. 96).   
25 See Medicus, D., Schuldrecht I, Allgemeiner Teil, (12th edit. 2000), p. 275; Magnus,U., Schaden und 
Ersatz, supra note 24, p.29; Roth, A, “Das Integritätsinteresse des Geschädigten und das Postulat der 
Wirtschaftlichkeit der Schadensbehebung”, Juristen Zeitung 1994, pp. 1091 ff., p.1092. 
26 See Magnus, U., supra note 25, p 61. 
27 See Magnus, U., supra note 25, p. 58; Magnus, U., “Damages under German Law”, supra note 24, p. 
105. 
28  See Hamann, U., Schadensersatz in Natur oder Geld bei Sachsschäden (1974), p.149. 
29 BGH 23.3.1976, BGHZ 66, p. 239, see Magnus, U., supra note 25, p. 59. 
30 BGH 5.3.1985, Versicherungsrecht 1985, 593. See Magnus, U., supra note 25, p. 60.  
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damages are awarded routinely.
31 The latter opinion prevailed on the basis that the costs 
of repair are a proxy of the diminution of the value of the thing. It was claimed moreover 
that the owners of damaged things should be treated equally, no matter whether they 
intend to repair the thing or sell it as is, since their intentions are of no interest to the 
court.
32 Clearly, these arguments can be easily challenged. 
The recent reform of the law of compensation rules out the possibility for the 
victim to collect the VAT, if he did not really perform the repair. The recovery of the 
VAT, in cases where no repair had taken place, is a fictitious damage. Therefore, the new 
law which prevents the recovery of this damage is reasonable. However, it is difficult to 
understand why the reform is restricted to this particular kind of fictitious damage and 
does not treat other similar matters along the same lines.
 33  
As far as §251 BGB is concerned, its first provision is logically necessary; when 
repair is indeed impossible, there exists no other option than monetary compensation 
calculated on the basis of the difference theory.
34 However, the same provision applies 
when the restitution in natura is disproportionally costly. Disproportion is a rather vague 
term, but it has been interpreted in a concrete way.
35 The rule is particularly clear in case 
of car damages. In these cases, a repair is considered to be disproportional when it costs 
more than 130% of the value of the car before the damage. 
36 
37  
This rule can be depicted as follows (V is the value of the thing before damage
38): 
                 O          V      R 
                      
        Costs for tortfeasor 
    130% V 
                                                 
31 See Magnus, U., supra note 25, p.59. 
32 See Magnus, U., supra note 25, p. 60. 
33 See Karczewski, C., “Der Referentenentwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Änderung 
schadenersatzrechtlicher Vorschriften”, Versicherungsrecht 2001, pp. 1070 ff., p.1074. 
34 In Germany this theory is interpreted under the light of the abstract (or objective) calculation of the 
damage. 
35 See Medicus, D., supra  note 25, p. 278. 
36 See Magnus, U., supra note 25, p. 106; Schiemann, G., in von Staudingers, J., supra note 24, §251 BGB, 
No 22ff, p. 180. 
37 §251.2 BGB relaxes the condition of proportionality in the case of injury of animals. 
38 This issue also involves the comparison between the value of the thing and the replacement costs which, 
however, exceeds the scope of this paper. 
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This provision seems to be quite useful for the purpose of preventing extreme 
overdeterrence effects and inefficient repairs. Nevertheless, rigid interpretation seems 
arbitrary.
39 In the bottom line the efficiency of the repair is decided by the use of 
objective criteria, if S exceeds O by 30%. In these cases the victim is undercompensated.  
In general, German Law is inflexible, as far as tort remedies are concerned. The 
restitution in natura, in its broader sense, is a general principle of German tort law 
inspired by concerns for distributive and corrective justice. The interest of the victim in 
the value of the thing (Wertsinteresse) and his interest in the thing itself 
(Integritätsinteresse) are treated as qualitatively different.
40 This does not really conform 
to the preventive goal of tort law.   
 
3.2. England 
 In English Common Law tort damages are always monetary.
41 Restitution in 
natura is hardly an option in tort law.
42 Thus, damages should cover the diminution of the 
(market) value of the thing.
43 This diminution of the value of the thing is prima facie 
given by its costs of repair or replacement.
44 
45  
The rule seems reasonable. Since it is only a prima facie rule, the defendant can 
challenge it.
46 However, in practice, it is hardly ever reversed.
47 This is manifested in the 
Glenfinlas case where the plaintiff received repair costs, even though he admitted before 
the court that he does not intend to repair his vessel.
48  
                                                 
39 This rule also seems to prevent excessively inefficient repair and prevents the further increase of the 
monopoly bargaining power of the victim. However, this does not seem to be an important issue in German 
law anyway, since the award of the costs of repair, as opposed to the repair itself, prevents bargaining.  
40 See Medicus, D., “Naturalrestitution und Geldersatz”, Juristische Schulung 1969, pp. 449 ff., p.449; 
Roth, A., supra note 25, p. 1091; Coester-Waltjen, D., “Die Naturalrestitution im Deliktsrecht“, Jura, 1996, 
pp. 270 ff.  
41 See Stoll, H., “Consequences of Liability: Remedies”, in Tunc, A. (ed), International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Vol. XI, Torts, 1983, Ch. 8,  s. 39, p.41. 
42 See Rogers, H., “Damages under English Law”, in Magnus, U. (ed), Unification of Tort Law: Damages 
(2001), p. 53 ff, p. 58. 
43 See Mc Gregor, H., “On Damages”, in Common Law Library, 9 (16
th edit. 1997), p. 44. 
44 See Stoll, H., Haftungsfolgen im bürgerlichen Recht (1993), p.161. 
45 An exception to this practice may arise in cases of damages to land but not necessarily. See Mc Gregor, 
H., supra note 43, pp. 44-45. 
46 See Rogers, H., supra note 42, p. 67; Mc Gregor, H., supra  note 43, p. 870. 
47 See Rogers, H., supra note 42, p. 65. 
48 See Rogers, H., supra note 42, p. 75, Mc Gregor, supra note 43 p.873. 
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In addition, fictitious damages are often compensated
49. This is evident in the 
London Corporation case where the plaintiff received repair costs for his ship, although 
he had sold it before the trial. Therefore, money damages are routinely calculated on the 
basis of the cost of restitution in natura.  
The main argument supporting this practice is that, in case of damaged things, the 
diminution of their price cannot be assessed because there is no market for damaged 
things. 
50 This argument, however, is not entirely convincing, since a price can be 
attached to anything, regardless of the existence of a market for it. 
Furthermore, in cases where the repair costs exceed the pre-accident value of the 
thing, the legal solution is not clear. Nonetheless, it seems that the rule is similar to 
German law in the sense that repair costs are usually awarded even if they exceed, to 
some extent, the initial value of the thing,
51 provided that the difference between these 
two values is not very significant. In the latter case, the diminution of the price of the 
thing
52 is granted to the victim.  
Overall, the results to which English law leads are not much different than those 
of German law, even though the starting point of the two legal systems is quite different. 
In general, monetary compensation is calculated on the basis of the costs of repair, 
without, however, obliging the victim to actually repair the damaged thing. Thus, no 
bargaining can result. This overcompensation of the victim distorts the incentives of both 
parties. This is obvious in the case of the compensation of fictitious damages. However, 
the misallocation effect due to an occasional inefficient repair is avoided. 
 
3.3. Greece 
In Greece the relevant article is article 297 of the Greek Civil Code, according to 
which compensation is monetary. In special cases the judge may opt for restitution in 
natura, if this does not conflict with the interests of the victim. If this provision is 
interpreted in combination with article 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to 
which the judge cannot decide on issues other than those brought before the court by the 
                                                 
49 See Mc Gregor, H., supra note 43, p. 870. 
50 See Rogers, H., supra note 42, p.75. 
51 See Magnus, U., supra note 25, p. 72. 
52 This is derived this time by the costs of replacement. 
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parties, ambiguity arises as to whether the judge can decide for restitution in natura if the 
parties have not asked for it. According to the prevailing opinion, this question should be 
answered negatively.
53 
The next step is to examine the way courts interpret the special circumstances 
which justify restitution in natura. In jurisprudence most cases of restitution in natura are 
characterized by asymmetric costs of repair, meaning that the costs of the tortfeasor to 
restitute the damage in natura are lower than those of the victim (e.g. when a car is 
crashed by the owner of a garage).
54 However, it is obvious that this interpretation is 
rather narrow. Thus, in practice not many cases of such restitution in natura exist.  
Monetary compensation is calculated on the basis of the difference theory,
55 
which is interpreted in the light of the theory of concrete evaluation of the damage.
56 This 
means that the special circumstances of each particular case are taken into account in 
order to approximate the damage for the specific victim. This rule often leads to a 
monetary compensation equal to the repair costs of the damaged thing but not 
necessarily.
57 
58 Nevertheless, since compensation is usually monetary, there is no scope 
for the parties to bargain.  
As far as fictitious damages are concerned, they are not compensated in Greece.
59 
Moreover, it is worth noting that, although there is no explicit rule preventing the award 
of repair costs which exceed the pre-accident value of the thing, judges would be 
reluctant to award them.  
However, overall, these rules seem to satisfy the need for flexibility. The judge 
has some discretion in the determination of the concrete amount of compensation. There 
seems to be no evidence of systematic over- or underdeterrence. 
                                                 
53 See, instead of others, Stathopoulos, M., in Georgiades, Ap./ Stathopoulos, M., Civil Code Commentary, 
Vol. II, Law of Obligations, General Part, (in Greek) (1979), CC 297-298, No 15, p. 64). 
54 See Georgiades, Ap., Obligation Law, General Part, (in Greek) (1999), p. 158. 
55 See Stathopoulos, M., supra note 53, No10, p.62. 
56 See Stathopoulos, M., supra note 53, No 25, p. 66. 
57 See Stathopoulos, M., supra note 53, No 112, p. 95. It is characteristic that when a thing is destroyed, 
then the victim does not receive full costs of replacement, but these costs are discounted, in case the 
damaged thing was not new.  
58 Many problems have arisen concerning the crucial time for the calculation of the compensation. See, 
among others,  Georgiades, Ast., “The time of the evaluation of the damage” (in Greek), in Essays in 
Honor of Gazis (1994), pp.111 ff. 
59 See Kerameus, K., “Damages under Greek Law”, in Magnus, U. (ed), Unification of Tort Law: Damages 
(2001), pp. 109 ff, p. 116. 
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3.4. France  
The French Civil Code does not contain any explicit provision about the form of 
compensation in case of torts. The judge may decide in favor of money damages or 
restitution in natura, without being bound by the demand of the parties. 
60  
In practice, courts usually award money damages, calculated on the basis of the 
repair or replacement costs of the damaged thing. 
61 These costs, however, cannot exceed 
the value of the replacement of the thing. 
62 As far as compensation for fictitious damages 
is concerned, the result is not clear. It seems though that such recovery is not 
systematically denied. 
63 
Overall, the French legal system is very flexible and could lead to optimal results. 
Ideally the judge could distinguish between the cases where subjective value should be 
protected, and the cases where subjective concerns do not seem to exist. However, in 
France the concern to fully compensate the victim is very intense. Therefore, it could be 
expected that in the final analysis overcompensation ensues, and hence overdeterrence 
will result.   
 
4. Conclusion 
To sum up, the choice of the tort remedy can influence the final amount of 
compensation owed and induces both parties to adjust their level of care and activity 
accordingly. The efficient result would occur if compensation coincided with the 
subjective damages of the victim. Since in reality the victim will never reveal his true 
subjective valuation, this is not feasible. Hence, the second best solution is to apply the 
tort remedy which can lead to the closest approximation of the ideal result. This remedy 
is not necessarily the same for all cases, but can vary according to the height of the 
subjective costs of the victim. To the extent that third parties (i.e. the judges) can roughly 
identify the different types of cases, flexibility of the legal system is really important.  
                                                 
60 See Starck, B., Obligations, 1. Responsabilité Délictuelle, (5th edit 1996), p.517; Kousoulos, I., 
“Remarks on CC 297”, (in Greek), Elliniki Dikaiosini (Greek Justice), 1960, pp.15 ff., p.17. 
61 See Galand-Carval, S., “Damages under French Law”, in Magnus, U. (ed), Unification of Tort Law: 
Damages (2001), pp. 77 ff., p. 82. 
62 See Magnus, U., supra note 25, p. 54, Stoll, H., supra note 44, p. 161. 
63 See Magnus, U., supra note 25, p. 71; contra, Galand-Carval, supra note 61, p. 87. 
21 Zervogianni: REMEDIES FOR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY: MONEY DAMAGES OR RESTITUTIO
Produced by bepress.com, 2011MONEY DAMAGES OR RESTITUTION IN NATURA?               Eleni Zervogianni   22  
In practice, in all legal systems repair costs are usually awarded to the victim, 
regardless of the actual repair of the damaged item. In fact this is a form of monetary 
compensation, irrespective of the legal term used to describe it. Thus, the possibility of ex 
post bargaining of the parties is excluded. Generally, it leads to systematic 
overcompensation of the victim, followed by overdeterrence of the tortfeasor.  
An issue closely related to the current topic is this of the relationship between 
repair and replacement of damaged things, especially when the costs of repair exceed the 
costs of replacement. Moreover, a further step would be the enrichment of the analysis by 
taking into account the relevant procedural rules. Another important extension would 
concern the impact of insurance on the current analysis.   Finally, empirical studies could 
shed some light on the height of subjective damages suffered by the victims and the 
transaction costs associated with each remedy. 
Understanding the effects of different institutions becomes increasingly more 
important, considering the eventual drafting of the European Civil Code. It is worth 
mentioning that, in the Draft of the Study Group on a European Civil Code regarding the 
Principles of Tort Law, this issue is not decided yet. 
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